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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to order
of the Supreme Court dated the 14th day of January 2005.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

The trial court found for plaintiff under a theory of negligence and
apportioned fault and damages at 50% to defendant and 50% to plaintiff. This
ruling raises three issues for review:
1.

Did the trial court err in considering plaintiffs demands under a

theory of negligence where the cause of action was not pled or tried by express or
implied consent of the parties? The standard of review of, " . . . the trial court's
application of rule 15(b) is a legal question that [appellate courts] review for
"correctness." Archuleta v. Hughes, 969 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1998).
2.

Are the court's findings insufficiently supported by the evidence?

Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that "findings of fact... shall
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses."
3.

Did the court error in awarding plaintiff damages after it found that

defendant was not more at fault than plaintiff? Because this issue presents a legal
question the standard of review is for correctness without deference to the trial

4

court's ruling. Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68, P14; 56 P.3d 524,
530 (Utah 2002).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS

§ 78-27-38. Comparative negligence
(1)
The fault of a person seeking recovery may not alone bar recovery
by that person.
(2)
A person seeking recovery may recover from any defendant or group
of defendants whose fault, combined with the fault of persons immune from suit
and nonparties to whom fault is allocated, exceeds the fault of the person seeking
recovery prior to any reallocation of fault made under Subsection 78-27-39(2).
(3)
No defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery for any
amount in excess of the proportion of fault attributed to that defendant under
Section 78-27-39.
(4)
(a)
The fact finder may, and when requested by a party shall,
allocate the percentage or proportion of fault attributable to each person seeking
recovery, to each defendant, to any person immune from suit, and to any other
person identified under Subsection 78-27-41(4) for whom there is a factual and
legal basis to allocate fault. In the case of a motor vehicle accident involving an
unidentified motor vehicle, the existence of the vehicle shall be proven by clear
and convincing evidence which may consist solely of one personfs testimony.
(b) Any fault allocated to a person immune from suit is considered
only to accurately determine the fault of the person seeking recovery and a
defendant and may not subject the person immune from suit to any liability, based
on the allocation of fault, in this or any other action.

Rule 15, U R C P. Amended and supplemental pleadings.
(a)
Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of
course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one
to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed
upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is
served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by
written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice
so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended pleading within the
time remaining for response to the original pleading or within 10 days after service
of the amended pleading, whichever period may be the longer, unless the court
otherwise orders.
(b)
Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by
the pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be
treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the
evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any
time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the result of the
trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is
not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to
be amended when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved
thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of such
evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense upon the
merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable the objecting
party to meet such evidence.
(c)
Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense
asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or
occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the
amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading.
(d)
Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may,
upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a
supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events which
have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented.
Permission may be granted even though the original pleading is defective in its
statement of a claim for relief or defense. If the court deems it advisable that the
adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it shall so order, specifying the
time therefor.
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Rule 52, U R C P. Findings by the court.
(a)
Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 5 8A;
in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth
the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its
action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of
fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial
court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. The findings of a master, to the
extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the court.
It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law are stated orally
and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an
opinion or memorandum of decision filed by the court. The trial court need not
enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as
provided in Rule 41(b). The court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of
the ground for its decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b),
56, and 59 when the motion is based on more than one ground.
(b)
Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days
after entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional
findings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with
a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made in
actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not the party
raising the question has made in the district court an objection to such findings or
has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judgment, or a motion for a
new trial.
(c)
Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions
for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the parties
to an issue of fact:
(1)

by default or by failing to appear at the trial;

(2)

by consent in writing, filed in the cause;

(3)

by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes.

n

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND
DISPOSITION BELOW:
This case presents a dispute where plaintiff filed suit against defendant

seeking $11,773.50 as an "unpaid balance due of the agreed price and reasonable
value for the merchandise, services or other things of value sold by plaintiff to
defendant." No other cause of action or legal theory was alleged. A copy of the
complaint is included in the addendum and marked as Exhibit "A.55
Despite the fact that this was pled as an attempt to collect on a sales or
service contract, it is actually a case where plaintiff shipped fish to defendant for
the purpose of having defendant can the same and return it to plaintiff for resale.
The court actually found for plaintiff on a theory of negligence. A theory
not pled in the complaint and to which plaintiff presented no evidence or
argument. The ruling was pursuant to Rule 15(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The court apportioned fault equally between plaintiff and defendant and
entered judgment against defendant for 50% of plaintiff s losses.
2.

STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED
FOR REVIEW:
Rochelle Gibson, plaintiff Silver Creek Farms' office manager, was the sole

witness for plaintiff at trial. In brief summary she testified that she entered into an
oral contract with Grant White, president of defendant company, Trout of
Paradise, Inc., to can some fish. She shipped the fish to defendant during the

x

month of November 1998. Defendant canned some of the fish and shipped it back
to her. Transcript p. 6.
Ms. Gibson was aware that Mr. White did not have enough cans on hand to
do all the fish she had sent and understood that he would store the remaining fish
in his freezer until he could acquire more cans. Transcript p. 25 - 27.
Later in 1999 when she spoke to Mr. White about the remaining fish, he
informed her that his freezer had failed and the fish spoiled. She testified that she
accepted Mr. White's explanation as truth. Transcript p. 7, 18.
Ms. Gibson did not testify that the parties made any agreement regarding
who would bear the risk of loss if the fish spoiled. Most notably, she did not testify
to any fact and made no assertion that defendant was in any way negligent.
At the conclusion of plaintiff s case defendant made a motion to dismiss the
cause of action because plaintiff failed to articulate a legal theory or cause of
action and produce evidence in support of each element of the same. Transcript p.
36-40.
In particular plaintiff argued, "There's been no claim that he was negligent
in operating the freezer . . . . " Transcript p. 37. And then again, "They certainly
haven't made a . . . claim on negligence." Transcript p. 40. The plaintiff did not
dispute these assertions and did not thereupon ask to amend the complaint to add a
negligence cause of action. With no such claim there was no need for presenting a
defense to negligence.

The court asked defendant, "What is the legal basis for your claim?"
Transcript p. 40. The defendant answered with three theories, (i) breach of oral
contract, (ii) some vague invoice theory—that plaintiff billed defendant for the
spoiled fish and therefore he owed the money, and (iii) unjust enrichment. Plaintiff
moved the court to amend the pleadings to add these three causes of action.
Transcript p. 40 - 44. The court allowed the pleadings to be amended to allow a
claim under a theory of breach of an oral contract. It appears that the court allowed
the second theory to remain as well; but the court specifically rejected the third
theory of unjust enrichment. Transcript p. 4 6 - 4 7 . There was no discussion about
negligence.
With the oral contract and "invoice" theories on the table, the defendant
called four witnesses including Grant White who testified regarding the oral
contract, invoice theory, damages, settlement and other matters in defense of the
theories put forward.
At the conclusion of the evidence the parties argued the case. The court
found against plaintiff of the second theory, the "invoice" theory. The court
invited the parties to brief the remaining issue, risk of loss under the parties' oral
contract. The court also agreed to allow the parties to submit any additional
information on accord and satisfaction. Transcript p. 105.
The parties briefed the issues of risk of loss and accord and satisfaction.
Plaintiff and defendant's briefs are included in the addendum and marked as
Exhibits "B" and "C" respectively. On the 29th day of October 2004 the court
10

issued its memorandum decision. A copy of the Memorandum Decision is
attached hereto and marked as Exhibit "D."
The court specifically found that "there was no agreement concerning risk
of loss for the destruction of the fish." But then found, "that while the complaint of
the Plaintiff is not the most artfully drafted and does not specifically plead
negligence, the Plaintiff has referred to negligence in the memorandum filed after
the trial. Pursuant to Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure the Court is
considering this legal theory according to the proof presented at trial." The only
reference plaintiff made to negligence was in the post trial brief styled: Trial
Memorandum Regarding Allocation of Risk of Loss and Accord and Satisfaction.
Plaintiffs vague reference was on page 5 and 6 where negligence was mentioned
as an element of a theory of bailment. Plaintiff had previously made clear that he
was not pursuing a claim for bailment. Transcript p. 40.
Ultimately, the court found plaintiff and defendant equally negligent and
"apportioned the loss between Silver Creek and White at 50 percent each."
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
At the conclusion of the presentation of the evidence and argument the
court awarded judgment for plaintiff based on a theory of negligence. It is
respectfully submitted that this Court should reverse the judgment of the trial court
below for the following three reasons. First, the trial court should not have created
a negligence cause of action after the parties had both rested their cases and
concluded arguments. Second, the trial court should not have found the defendant
negligent because no evidence was presented by plaintiff relative to negligence
and some evidence from defendant suggested a lack of negligence. Third, the court
clearly violated the comparative negligence statute by ordering defendant to pay
damages to plaintiff after finding defendant's fault did not exceed plaintiffs fault.
ARGUMENT
1.

THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN CONSIDERING
NEGLIGENCE AS A CAUSE OF ACTION IN THIS CASE.

The trial court below, on its own motion, added to plaintiffs contract claim
a cause of action based on negligence—after both sides had rested their cases and
argued the same. The issue of negligence did not even come up until after
defendant had rested and argued his case. Consequently, the defendant had no
genuine opportunity to present evidence combating the theory. Defendant was
denied due process and a meaningful opportunity to defend himself.
A trial court can consider a cause of action not alleged in the complaint
under Rule 15(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 15(b) provides: "When
issues not raised by the pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the
10

parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the
pleadings." (Emphasis added.) It was based on this rule that the trial court, in the
immediate case, considered plaintiffs demand under a negligence theory even
though negligence had not been pled, the plaintiff had not asked for an amendment
to add the same and had presented no evidence on the matter.
The standard of review of, " . . . the trial court's application of rule 15(b) is
a legal question that [appellate courts] review for "correctness." Archuleta v.
Hughes, 969 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1998). The Archuleta court noted, however that,
" . . . because the trial court's determination of whether the issues were tried with
all the parties' implied consent' is highly fact intensive, we grant the trial court a
fairly broad measure of discretion in making that determination under a given set
of facts." Id.
In the immediate case, an exhaustive review of the trial transcript reveals
that plaintiff did not present even a scintilla of evidence on the issue of
defendant's negligence and therefore defendant did not implicitly consent to the
issue being tried—because it wasn't tried. Plaintiff provided no evidence that
defendant was negligent. As a consequence, defendant did not present evidence in
defense of the unstated accusation. Defendant did testify to some minimal facts
that tended to show he was not negligent but without a claim of negligence there
was no real opportunity or need to folly defend against the unstated claim.

Rule 15(b) can only be invoked where the issue is actually "tried."
Negligence was not tried in the immediate case. Defendant did not have his day in
court on the issue.
When the trial court below found for plaintiff on a theory of negligence he
made the following finding: "the court finds that White should have made sure the
freezer was working properly and while he was serving in the military he should
have had someone else caring for the freezer." Because plaintiff did not accuse
defendant of negligence and defendant did not perceive negligence as an issue he
did not present a defense to the same. Consequently, the court could not fairly
conclude that he did not insure the freezer was working properly or did not have
someone else caring for it.
2.

THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL IS INSUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURTS' FINDINGS OF FACT. THE
COURT ERRED FINDING DEFENDANT NEGLIGENT.

The trial court found that, " . . . White should have made sure the freezer
was working properly and while he was serving in the military he should have had
someone else caring for the freezer." Based on this finding of fact the court
concluded that defendant was negligent. It is defendant's position that the finding
and ultimate decision, that defendant was negligent, are clearly erroneous not
being supported by the evidence.
Challenging a trial court's findings of fact is a considerable burden. Rule
52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that "findings of fact... shall not
be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the

opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." The
procedure for challenging the sufficiency of the evidence was set forth in In re
Estate of Bartell 776 P.2d 885 (Utah 1989). In Bartell the Utah Supreme Court
stated that: "An appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and
then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking
in support as to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence/ thus making them
'clearly erroneous.5" Id. at 886.
Showing the insufficiency of the evidence in the immediate case is
relatively straight forward. First, the credibility of the witnesses is not a factor as
there was no contradictory evidence presented on the issue of negligence. Second
and even more significant, the reason there was no contradictory evidence is
because plaintiff presented no evidence alleging defendant was negligent.
Because no allegation was brought against defendant for negligence, either
in the complaint or presentation of plaintiff s case, defendant had no need to detail
a defense to the same. But in the course of testifying, Mr. White made a few
statements that are helpful in determining the court's finding is not supported by
the evidence. So far as marshaling the evidence on the subject of negligence there
are only three small sections in the colloquy that are even slightly applicable.
First, Grant White is very experienced in the fish business. He testified that
is the third generation to run the family business. His involvement dates back to
1979. Transcript p. 53, 63.

Second, in Mr. White's twenty years in the fish business this incident with
plaintiffs fish in the summer of 1999 was the only time he had some fish spoil.
Mr. White testified as follows on direct examination as found on page 55 - 56:
Q.

Was there ever a time in the course of your relationship with [Silver
Creek Farms] that fish was spoiled or destroyed?

A.

Heaven's no.

Q.

So there was never any kind of understanding?

A.

That the fish would spoil or be destroyed?

Q.

There was never - you never had an occasion when fish was spoiled
or destroyed?

A.

No.

Third, the following section of the colloquy on pages 64 -65:
Q.

Okay. Let's turn our attention to the summer of '99. Where was this
fish of Silver Creek stored at that time?

A.

It had been in the freezer down just like a walkway away from the
cannery. The freezer that I used to use to freeze our processed fish.

Q.

And is that freezer maintained and taken care of or what do you do
with that?

A.

Once a week, when we were heavy into processing and had fish in
there all the time, we would go in and defrost. But that's when the
freezer was full and we were going in and out. And it would have a
buildup in the blower so we had to defrost the ice off the blowers.
But if you put something in and weren't opening it continuously,
you wouldn't have that kind of a problem.
We would check the fish in the freezer once every three weeks or
check the freezer - well, I had to do it once a month because they
were calling me for inventory once a month. I'd go down and check
the freezer. I had a thermometer in the freezer that would tell me
what the temperature in the freezer was.
No problems with the freezer?

Q.

u

A.

I've never had any problems with the freezers.

Q.

Ever?

A.

They've been in since - they're older freezers. They've been in -

Q.

A long time?

A.

— probably since the early fifties.

Q.

Did you have an occasion to be gone with the military?

A.

Yeah. I had to go to the Army War College in June. It might have
been part in May and part in June. I was gone for just over two
weeks.

Q.

When you returned from the war college what did you discover?

A.

I walked into my office and I could smell something that was just
knocking me dead, so I walked down the stairs to see where it was
coming from. The freezer was out. The blowers were going, but
sometime during the last time I had checked and when I came back
from the war college, it had developed a leak in the Freon so the
Freon wasn't running through it and it wasn't freezing anymore.

Plaintiff did not cross-examine Mr. White on this subject. It seems difficult
to understand how the court would conclude that Mr. White "should have made
sure the freezer was working properly," inferring that he was negligent in not
caring for the freezer, when he testified it was working properly, had always
worked properly. And no one testified he was not taking proper care of it.
Obviously, a freezer can go out due to a number of reasons other than negligence.
The mere fact that the freezer failed is not proof by a preponderance of the
evidence that he was negligent. Second, no one testified that he didn't have

"someone else caring for the freezer" while he was gone for two weeks or if, based
on all the circumstances, that someone else was necessary to care for the freezer.
The plaintiff did not attempt to prove negligence. The plaintiff did not
allege negligence. The plaintiff did not seek to amend the compliant to add a
negligence cause of action. Possibly, the defendant did not believe a negligence
cause of action was reasonable here.
3.

THE COURT'S RULING VIOLATED THE STATE'S STATUTE
ON CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE, U.C.A. § 78-27-38.

The court found that plaintiff and defendant were both negligent and
apportioned the risk of loss between them. Ultimately, the court "apportioned the
loss between Silver Creek and White at 50 percent to each."
Utah is a comparative negligent state. U.C.A. § 78-27-38(2) provides: "A
person seeking recovery may recover from any defendant or group of defendants
whose fault, combined with the fault of persons immune from suit and nonparties
to whom fault is allocated, exceeds the fault of the person seeking recovery . . . . "
Because this issue presents a legal question the standard of review is for
correctness without deference to the trial court's ruling. Prince v. Bear River Mut.
Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68, P14; 56 P.3d 524, 530 (Utah 2002). The trial court erred as
a matter of law, because once the court found that defendant's fault did not exceed
plaintiffs fault, the court was barred from awarding any damages to plaintiff
based on negligence.

CONCLUSION
Defendant prays that this court reverse the judgment of the lower court.
Defendant further prays for an order awarding him costs in this appeal and any
other relief deemed appropriate in the circumstances.
DATED this 7th day of October 2005.
DAINES, WYATT & ALLEN, LLP

Scott L Wyatt
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ELGGREN & VAN DYKE
Stephen B. Elggren (0970)
Paul H. Van Dyke (3317)
Attorneys for Plaintiff
7390 South Creek Road #201
Sandy, UT 84093
P.O. Box 900790
Sandy, UT 84090-0790
Telephone: (801) 304-3600
Fax: (801)304-9996
No: 02001094
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IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUOTY
STATE OF UTAH
SILVER CREEK FARMS,

|

fi&tfW
SUMMONS

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 0%O/O

/15/

TROUT OF PARADISE COLLECTIONS,

Judge uJ<JULryyUyJ^L

Z>C

Defendants).

THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT(S):
You are hereby summoned and required to file a written answer to the attached Complaint
with the Clerk of the above-entitled Court, 140 North 100 West, Logan, Utah 84321, and to serve
upon, or mail to ELGGREN & VAN DYKE, Plaintiffs attorney,7390 South Creek Road #201,
Sandy, UT 84093, P.O. Box 900790, Sandy, UT 84090-0790, a copy of said answer, within 20 days
after service of this summons upon you. If you fail so to do, judgment by default will be taken
against you for the relief demanded in said Complaint, which has been filed with the Clerk of said
Court and a copy of which is hereto annexed and herewith served upon you.
1

». 4^

SERVE: Defendant's Registered Agent Grant L. White at 399 W. 9000 S. Paradise, UT 84328, or
P.O. Box 129, Paradise UT 84328.
Serve Defendant individually at or at „ .

DATED September 25,2002.
ELGGREN & VAN DYKE

;TEPHEJB.ELGGRfci
Stephen B. Elggren
Paul H. Van Dyke
Attorney for Plaintiff

This is an attempt to collect a debt by a debt collector and any information obtained will be used
for that purpose.
F:\USERS\w\21094.cmp

ELGGREN & VAN DYKE
Stephen B. Elggren (0970)
Paul H. Van Dyke (3317)
Attorneys for Plaintiff
7390 South Creek Road #201
Sandy, UT 84093
P.O. Box 900790
Sandy, UT 84090-0790
Telephone: (801) 304-3600
Fax: (801)304-9996
No: 02001094

COli^'V

IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
COMPLAINT

SILVER CREEK FARMS,

Civil No. O&O/O

Plaintiff,
vs.

Judge

/s?3~/

~X?(L

U)juttn\^Ju

TROUT OF PARADISE COLLECTIONS,
Defendants).

Plaintiff complains of Defendant and alleges:
1. Plaintiff does not transact business in Utah within the meaning of 16-10a-1501 of
Utah Code Annotated. Plaintiff either (a) sells through independent contractors; (b) solicits
or obtains orders by mail through employees or agents or otherwise, which orders are
accepted outside of the state of Utah before they become contracts; (c) transacts business in
interstate commerce; or (d) participates in other activities which are not considered to be
transacting business in the State of Utah.
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2.

Defendant owes Plaintiff the sum of $11,773.50, as set forth on Plaintiffs

Statement of Account with Defendant, together with interest accruing thereon at the rate of
10% per annum from November 23, 2000. A copy of said statement is annexed hereto as
Exhibit "A."
3.

The above sum represents the unpaid balance due of the agreed price and

reasonable value for the merchandise, services or other things of value sold by Plaintiff to
Defendant.
4. If the court determines that Defendant's defense to this action is without merit or
is not asserted in good faith, Plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees under 78-27-56,
Utah Code Annotated (1981 Supp.)
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against Defendant in the sum of $11,773.50,
together with interest as set forth above, costs of court and general relief.
ELGGREN & VAN DYKE

S1VHEIIB. ELGGREiS
Stephen B. Elggren
Paul H. Van Dyke
Attorney for Plaintiff
This is an attempt to collect a debt by a debt collector and any information obtained will be
used for that purpose.
Plaintiffs Address:
450 South Locust St.
PO Box 351
Twin Falls, ID 83303
F:\USERS\w\21094.cmp
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"B"

STEPHEN B. ELGGREN, P.C.
Stephen B. Elggren (0970)
Attorney for Plaintiff
7390 South Creek Road #201
Sandy, UT 84093
P.O. Box 900790
Sandy, UT 84090-0790
Telephone: (801) 304-3600
Fax: (801)304-9996
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

SILVER CREEK FARMS,
TRIAL MEMORANDUM REGARDING
ALLOCATION OF RISK OF LOSS AND
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 020101751
TROUT OF PARADISE, INC.,
Judge Willmore
Defendant.

Plaintiff, by and through counsel, hereby submits the following Trial Memorandum
Regarding Allocation of Risk of Loss and Accord and Satisfaction.
AUTHORITY
1. ALLOCATION OF RISK OF LOSS

1

The issue of allocation ofrisk of loss has been considered in multiple cases in which courts
have generally held that one who is in possession of another's property "is in a better
position to control the conditions that may cause loss or damage and to know, or at least to
be able to ascertain, the cause ofany actual loss or damage". (Emphasis Added). See, generally,
Cornia v. Wilcox, 898 P.2d 1379, 1384 (Utah 1995); McPherson v. Belnap, 830 P.2d 302
306 (UtahCtApp. 1992). Thus, liability has generally been placed on the party in possession of
the property which is the party most likely to be able to avert the loss.
While many ofthese cases deal with the issue ofbailment, the policy supporting liability
remains applicable in the instant case.
In Cornia v. Wilcox, 898 P.2d 1379, (Utah 1995), the defendant, Wilcox entered into
agreements with Cornia to care for approximately 500 head of cattle for one year. According to
the parties agreements, Wilcox was to care for the cattle, many ofwhich were pregnant, and to
return the cattle and the expected calves to Cornia. Wilcox was to be compensated for his care
ofthe cattle over the contract term. Upon completion ofthe contract term, many ofthe cattle had
disappeared and over one hundred fewer calves were returned than were expected. Cornia sued
for breach of contract and common law agistment. The court held that the contract where one
agrees to keep and care for another's animals is an agistment contract and is a species ofbailment
and applied bailment law to the facts of the case.
While the contract in the instant case is not an agistment contract, the policy and rational
2

behind allocation ofrisk ofloss is relevant and applicable. Evidence at trial showed that Defendant
was in possession ofthe Smoked Sturgeon and Smoked Tilapia. Accordingly, Defendant was "in
a better position to control the conditions that may cause loss or damage" to the Smoked Sturgeon
and Smoked Tilapia. As such, the risk of loss should fall squarely on the shoulders of Defendant.
A similar policy placing liability for loss on the party in possession ofthe property is found
in the transfer of goods under the Uniform Commercial Code. Utah Code Section 70A-2-509
states as follows:
(1) Where the contract requires or authorized the seller to ship the goods by carrier
(a) ifit does not require him to deliver them at a particular destination, the risk of
loss passes to the buyer when the goods are duly delivered to the carrier even though the
shipment is under reservation (Section 70A-2-505); but
(b) if it does require him to deliver them at a particular destination and the goods
are there duly tendered while in the possession of the carrier, the risk of loss passes to the
buyer when the goods are there duly so tendered as to enable the buyer to take delivery.
(2) Where the goods are held by a bailee to be delivered without being moved, the
risk of loss passes to the buyer
(a) on his receipt of a negotiable document of title covering the goods; or
(b) on acknowledgment by the bailee of the buyer's right to possession of
the goods; or
(c) after his receipt of a nonnegotiable document of title or other written
direction to deliver, as provided in Subsection (4)(b) of Section 70A-2-503.
(3) In any case not within Subsection (1) or (2), the risk of loss passes to the buyer on
his receipt of the goods if the seller is a merchant; otherwise the risk passes to the buyer
on tender of delivery.
(4) The provisions of this section are subject to contrary agreement ofthe parties and to
the provisions ofthis chapter on sale on approval (Section 70A-2-327) and on effect of breach
on risk of loss (Section 70A-2-510). (Emphasis Added).
This statute's predecessor was applied in Orr v. CleggLivestock Co., Inc., 232 P.2d
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752 (Utah 1951). In Orr v. Clegg Livestock Co., Inc., Orr and Clegg Livestock Co., Inc.
entered into an agreement whereby Orr (Seller) leased his ranch to Clegg Livestock Co., Inc.
(Buyer) and agreed to sell cattle to Buyer. The purchase price for the cattle was to be paid over
time as the cattle were gathered and counted. Title in the cattle remained with Seller until the
purchase price was paid in full. Thirteen cows died before the cattle were gathered and counted
and before the purchase price was due. Buyer claimed that it was not responsible for the loss of
the cattle even though it had possession of them because the contract of sale was executory and
the title remained with Seller until all the cattle had been gathered and counted. The court held that
Buyer having taken possession ofthe cattle at the time the agreement was entered into and the title
having been retained merely as security for the payment, Buyer assumed the risk of loss. "Having
taken possession, the burden of caring for the property fell upon the buyer." Id. (Emphasis
Added).
Even under the scenario ofa purchase, the party in possession generally has the burden of
caring for the property. Although the transfer ofpossession ofthe Smoked Sturgeon and Smoked
Tilapia to Defendant was not a sale, the policy placing the burden of care on the party in possession
of the smoked fish remains applicable.
As an exception to the general rule that aparty in possession is liable for the loss of goods
held for another, is where there is not exclusive possession. This exception is explained in Staheli
v. Farmers' Coop., 655 P.2d 680 (Utah 1982), which is materially distinguishable from the
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instant case. In Staheli v. Farmers' Coop,, the court refused to impose liability on the party in
possession of grain which was destroyed by fire because the court held that the owners ofthe grain
as well as others, including transients, also had unlimited access to the grain. Thus, the court
concluded that the party in possession ofthe grain did not have such control over the grain so as
to prevent or determine the cause of the loss. The issue of lack of exclusive possession of the
property was thus a determinative factor in allocating the risk of loss.
InMcPherson v. Belnap, 830 P.2d 302, (Utah CtApp. 1992) a textbook bailment case,
the McPherson' s left their furniture at a condominium they sold to Belnap. Belnap's son who
moved into the condominium was to keep the furniture safe for the McPhersons while he occupied
the condominium. The McPhersons had no key to the condominium or other access to their
furniture except through the Belnaps. The property was stolen and the McPhersons sued for failure
to return the furniture. The court held this was a bailment for the mutual benefit ofthe bailor and
bailee and when, in such an instance, the property could not be accounted for, a presumption of
negligence is imposed on the bailee once the bailor proves the fact ofbailment and damage to the
bailed goods. The fact that the bailor did not have a key to gain access to the property or similar
other means of obtaining possession ofthe bailed goods was a significant factor upon which the
court concluded that the risk of loss must fall upon the bailee.
Not only did the evidence at trial establish that Defendant was in possession ofthe smoked
fish in question, it also estabUshed that this possession was exclusive. Plaintififdid not have a key
5

or access to the building where the smoked fish was held. Moreover, even when Plaintiff
demanded return ofthe smoked fish it had no access to the product and was unable to secure its
release. Further, there was no evidence that any other party had access to the smoked fish.
Defendant was the party in exclusive control and possession of the smoked fish.
Even ifthe instant case were considered a species of bailment like that found in Cornia
v. Wilcox, 898P.2d 1379,1384 (Utah 1995), there is a presumption ofnegligence imposed on
Defendant. As the party in possession Defendant was in a better position to control the conditions
that caused the loss and thus the risk of loss should be allocated to Defendant.
2. ACCORD AND SATISFACTION
General principles of contract law govern accord and satisfaction. Estate Landscape
and Snow Removal Specialists Inc. v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 844
P.2d 322,327 (Utah 1992). Parties must consent to accord and satisfaction. Id. Accord and
satisfaction requires the satisfaction of a three-part test outlined by the Utah Supreme Court.
"There must be (1) a bona fide dispute over an unliquidated amount, (2) a payment made in foil
settlement of the entire dispute, and (3) an acceptance of the payment. Smith v. Grand
Canyon Expeditions Company, 84 P.3d 1154, (Utah 2003). The following standards for
this three-part test have been applied by the Supreme Court. Specifically, "there must be a
good-faith disagreement over the amount due under the contract. The disagreement need not
be well-founded, so long as it is in good faith". Estate Landscape and Snow Removal
6

Specialists Inc. v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., Supra., at 327. "[T]he
totality of the circumstances makes clear that such a dispute exists over an unliquidated amount
and that the creditor understood that the debtor was tendering the payment in
satisfaction of the entire dispute. M a t 328. (Emphasis Added).
The requirement that a creditor understand the intent of the debtor in making payment is
part of a well-recognized principle that, "a condition precedent to the enforcement of any
contract is that there be a meeting of the minds of the parties which must be spelled out, either
expressly or impliedly, with sufficient definiteness to be enforced." Dishinger v. Potter, 47
P.3d76 81 (Utah App. 2001).
In the instant case, Defendant claims a partial payment on its account with Plaintiff was
an accord and satisfaction. However, there was no evidence that Plaintiff understood and
accepted the tender of partial payment as satisfaction of the entire debt. In fact, Plaintiff was
not even aware of the payment which was given to a collection agency. Plaintiff did not accept
the payment as payment in full on a disputed amount due. There was no meeting of the minds
on that issue. Thus, the essential elements for accord and satisfaction are not present in the
instant case.
Furthermore, on a procedural matter, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 8, requires the
defense of accord and satisfaction to be plead specifically as an affirmative defense in the
answer. The answer fails to cite accord and satisfaction as an affirmative defense. Thus,
7

Defendants attempt to raise the defense at trial may be denied under Rule of Civil Procedure,
Rule 8.
SUMMARY
In summary the evidence presented at trial established that Defendant took exclusive
possession of the smoked fish at its place of business. Plaintiff had no access to the building
where the fish was located, nor could Plaintiff obtain thefishwhen Plaintiff demanded its return.
Defendant was the party in the best position to control the conditions that caused the loss.
Having taken possession, the burden of caring for the property fell upon the Defendant.
Defendant failed to present facts which support the necessary elements of accord and
satisfaction. Plaintiff and Defendant never had a meeting of the minds with respect to the partial
payment made to the collection agency. Plaintiff was not aware of the payment, and never
intended that its receipt constitute acceptance of payment in full on a disputed amount. Further,
accord and satisfaction was not specifically plead as an affirmative defense in the answer.
Consequently, there was no accord and satisfaction.
DATED July 15,2004.

STEPHEN B. ELGGREN, P.C.

a

Steph^ps/Elggren
Attorney for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL
I hereby certify that I served by mail a true and correct copy of the above Trial
Memorandum Regarding Allocation of Risk and Loss and Accord and Satisfaction, first class
postage prepaid, July 15, 2004, directed to:

N. George Daines
Barrett & Daines
108 North Main Street
Logan, Utah 84321
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Scott L Wyatt #5829
DAINES, WYATT & ALLEN, LLP
108 North Main
Logan, Utah 84321
Phone: (435) 753-4000
Fax: (435) 753-4002

"C"

COP^

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE STATE OF UTAH

SILVER CREEK FARMS,
Plaintiff,

DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM
REGARDING ALLOCATION OF
RISK OF LOSS

V.

TROUT OF PARADISE, INC.,
Defendant.

Civil No. 020101751 DC
Judge: Thomas L. Wlllmore

COMES NOW Defendant, Trout of Paradise, Inc., by and through counsel, Scott
L Wyatt of DAINES, WYATT & ALLEN, LLP and hereby responds to Plaintiffs Trial
Memorandum Regarding Allocation of Risk of Loss.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
The Court has not made a finding of any particular facts presented at trial. There
is dispute over various facts including whether the Defendant knew Plaintiff was shipping
fish in excess of what he could can that season, the value of the spoiled fish and whether
the Defendant had an agreement with a collections agent of Plaintiff s to settle the claim.
However, the undisputed, material facts to the issue of risk of loss are in summary as
follows:
1.

Plaintiff shipped a quantity of fish to Defendant.

2.

Defendant canned a portion of the fish and returned the canned portion to

Defendant.
3.

Defendant agreed to hold the excess, uncanned fish until he could obtain

additional cans to can the excess fish.
4.

The Plaintiffs fish was stored in Defendant's freezer on his premises in

Paradise, Utah.
5.

The parties never contemplated Defendant purchasing any of the fish from

Plaintiff or Plaintiff selling any of the fish to Defendant.
6.

The parties had no written contract that governed their relationship. They

had no written contract, oral agreement, pattern of past conduct or industry standards that
specified who would bear the risk of loss should the fish spoil or what value the fish
might hold in such an event.
7.

There was unchallenged and unrebutted evidence presented by Mr. White

that Defendant Trout of Paradise, Inc., exercised due care in storing the fish for Plaintiff.
8.

The Plaintiff never alleged that Defendant was negligent in any manner.

9.

After storing the fish for approximately six months the Defendant's

freezer failed, while he was temporarily out of town on Utah National Guard duty and the
fish spoiled.
ARGUMENT
1.

PLAINTIFF FAILS TO PRESENT A LEGAL THEORY OR CAUSE OF
ACTION UPON WHICH TO BASE HIS CLAIM.
The Plaintiffs memorandum is missing a legal theory. He has not articulated a

cause of action upon which relief can be granted and therefore his case should be
dismissed. He cites to and quotes from miscellaneous "risk of loss" cases but not in the
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context of any particular legal theory relevant to the immediate case. Let me restate
this—a careful review of the Defendant's memorandum reveals that he has not presented
a legal theory upon which he is entitled to recover from Defendant Grant White and
Trout of Paradise, Inc. "Risk of loss" is not a legal theory or a cause of action upon which
a plaintiff can recover. Risk of loss is a variable that changes from one legal theory or
cause of action to another.
Plaintiff has not alleged or argued negligence in his Trial Memorandum. He has
not alleged or argued breach of contract in his Memorandum. Specifically, the Plaintiff
does not see the immediate case as a bailment case1—but nevertheless cites to bailment
and agistment contract cases for analogous support. The Plaintiff acknowledges this is
not a sales contract2—but cites to Chapter 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code for
support. He tells us what his theories are NOT and analogizes these causes of actions to
the facts of this case but never states what his theory is, what his cause of action is.
Plaintiff, Silver Creek Farms is not the only party with damages here. Mr. White
has damages also. He lost his freezer, the expense of cleaning it up and disposing of the
spoiled fish, and his expected profits from canning the fish that spoiled. Damages alone
are not enough. A plaintiff must have a legal theory upon which to base his claim.
2.

THERE IS NO GENERAL PRESUMPTION UNDER UTAH LAW THAT THE
PARTY IN POSSESSION OF PROPERTY BEARS THE RISK OF LOSS. THE
PARTY IN POSSESSION IS NOT A GUARANTOR.
Plaintiff states in paragraph 1 of his Trial Memorandum that "[t]he issue of

allocation of risk of loss has been considered in multiple cases in which courts have
generally held that one who is in possession of another's property 'is in a better position
Page 2 of Plaintiff s Trial Memorandum Regarding Allocation of Risk of Loss and Accord and
Satisfaction.
2
Page 4 of Plaintiff s Trial Memorandum.
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to control the conditions that may cause loss or damage and to know, or at least to be able
to ascertain, the cause of any actual loss or damage'. .. . Thus liability has generally been
placed on the party in possession of the property which is the party most likely to be able
to avert the loss." The sub-quote is from Cornia v. Wilcox, 898 P.2d 1379 (Utah 1995).
The remaining language is the Plaintiffs own. Plaintiff also cites to McPherson v.
Belnap, 830 P.2d 302 (Utah App. 1992) as further support for the above proposition.
Plaintiff infers through the above statement that risk of loss is generally placed on
the party in possession. In reality, neither Cornia or McPherson, or any other case cited in
Plaintiffs memorandum, supports this assertion (except in a UCC sale of goods contract
discussed below). The quote from Cornia, a bailment case, in its entire context is quite
different than . The quote in full states:
We begin with a brief review of bailment and agistment law. Under traditional
bailment law, 'where goods bailed for a fee are damaged or destroyed, a
presumption of negligence is imposed on the bailee once the bailor proves the fact
of bailment and damage to the bailed goods. The bailee must then come forward
with evidence that the loss of damage was not due to the bailee's negligence.' The
rationale for this presumption is that the bailee, as the party in possession of the
bailed property, is in a better position to control the conditions that may cause loss
or damage and to know, or at least to be able to ascertain, the cause of any actual
loss or damage.
Cornia, 898 P.2d at 1383 (emphasis added).
Suffice it to say, there is no general rule found in statute or case law that the party
in possession of another's property bears the risk of loss if the property is damaged.
There is a presumption—in bailment cases—of negligence on the bailee if the property is
damaged or lost. This presumption is rebuttable. Not rebuttable with clear and convincing
evidence or even with a preponderance of evidence but rebuttable with "some evidence."
This rebuttable presumption of negligence is discussed further below.

4

In Staheli v. Farmers9 Co-op of Southern Utah, 655 P.2d 680, 683 (Utah 1982) the
Utah Supreme Court stated, "Notwithstanding the presumption [of negligence], the law
does not make the bailee for hire a guarantor

" Through suggesting a presumption

that risk goes with possession, the Plaintiff seeks to impose a guarantor responsibility on
Defendant. This is not fair and it is counter to Utah law.
3.

THE CLOSEST PLAINTIFF COMES TO PRESENTING A VIABLE THEORY
FOR RECOVERY AGAINST THE DEFENDANT IS UNDER A BAILMENT.
YET HE HAS NOT ALLEGED A BAILMENT EXISTED, ARGUED THAT A
BAILMENT EXISTED OR PROVED ALL THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF
AN ACTIONABLE BAILMENT CASE.
The second paragraph in Plaintiffs Trial Memorandum states: "While many of

these cases [presented in Plaintiffs memorandum] deal with the issue of bailment, the
policy supporting liability remains applicable in the instant case." Here and elsewhere in
Plaintiffs Trial Memorandum he suggests that the immediate case is not one of a
bailment, yet his entire memorandum, except for a brief mention to sales contracts,
Chapter 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code and Orr v. Clegg Livestock Co. Inc., 232
P.2d 752 (Utah 1951) discussed below, is drawn from bailment cases.
There are four types of bailments discussed in Plaintiffs memorandum and the
cases he cites therein. (A) mutual benefit bailment, (B) gratuitous bailment, (C) UCC
bailment and (D) Agistment Contract.
A.

MUTUAL BENEFIT BAILMENT. Citing to a long line of Utah cases, the

McPherson Court defines when a bailment is created. "The creation of a bailment
requires that possession and control over an object pass from the bailor to the bailee." IcL
at 304. The Court fiirther stated, "Usually, the factor determining whether the transaction
is a bailment is whether the bailor surrenders possession and control over the property to
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the owner of the premises where the property is placed." The Court found that a bailment
was created in McPherson when the Defendant agreed to hold the Plaintiffs property.3
Id. This is exactly what happened in the immediate case. White agreed to hold the
Plaintiffs fish on his property until he could obtain the supplies needed to can the fish.
He held the fish for approximately 6 months before it spoiled.
If this is a bailment case, as McPherson suggests, the Plaintiff needs to prove
more than the mere fact that the fish spoiled while in the possession of the Defendant.
The risk of loss does not automatically go with possession in bailment cases.
In McPherson, the Court sets forth the proof requirements and presumptions
Plaintiff must follow in a bailment trial. "[1] When the bailment is for the mutual benefit
of the bailor and the bailee, and the property cannot be accounted for, a presumption of
negligence is imposed on the bailee once the bailor proves the fact of bailment and
damage to or absence of the bailed goods. [2] The bailee must then come forward with
evidence that the loss or damage was not due to the bailee's negligence." Id. at 306. The
court continues, "To rebut a presumption of negligence, a defendant must present some
evidence of due care. [3] Once a defendant presents evidence to prove due care, the

The facts in McPherson are as follows. The McPhersons sold their home to Vaughn Belnap and moved
into Belnap's condominium under a six-month lease agreement. Before the six months were up Belnap told
the McPhersrons that he had a buyer for the condominium and asked them to vacate the condo to make way
for the buyer. The McPhersons agreed but in the short time they were allowed to look for new
accommodations could only find a furnished apartment, therefore, they did not need their furniture and had
nowhere to store it in the meantime. Belnap represented that he was selling the condo to his son who
needed furniture and that they would be delighted to store, and use, the furniture in the condo until the
McPhersons could find a permanent place to store it. The McPhersons moved out, leaving a number of
items in the condominium. Belnap's son moved in as a tenant (not a purchaser). The McPhersons had no
key or other access to their furniture except through Belnap. Within a month of moving out of the
condominium Belnap reported that the furniture was stolen. The McPhersons sued Belnap under two legal
theories: conversion or breach of an oral bailment contract.
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presumption of law disappears, but an inference of negligence remains for the trier of fact
to weigh along with the defendant's evidence" (emphasis added.) Id.
In other words, risk of loss does not automatically pass with possession and the
person holding the property is not automatically liable to the owner for a loss. The
Defendant must be found to be negligent before the Plaintiff can recover his losses.
Reviewing the evidence presented in the immediate case, in light of McPherson, the
Plaintiff fails to meet his burden.
In the immediate case (1) the Plaintiff presented evidence at trial that he shipped
fish to the Defendant who held it at his premises in Paradise, Utah. Plaintiff further
presented evidence that the fish was damaged or spoiled. Defendant conceded these facts.
Under a bailment theory, proof of these facts invoked a presumption that the loss of the
fish was due to the Defendant's negligence. (2) The Defendant was then required to come
forward with "some evidence" that the loss or damage was not due to his negligence. Mr.
White provided the necessary evidence. He testified that he stored the excess fish in his
freezer; the freezer was in good repair; he checked it regularly; gave a inventory updates
to Plaintiff; but while briefly out of town on Utah National Guard duty the freezer
unexpectedly went out and the fish was spoiled. This more than qualifies as "some
evidence" that he was not negligent. Under these facts the Defendant exercised due care
and was not negligent.
Remember Mr. White is the Defendant and does not need to prove the absence of
negligence—he only needs to present some evidence that he exercised due care. (3) After
presenting some evidence of due care the presumption of negligence disappears, although
an inference remains. The Plaintiff still must convince the court, by a preponderance of
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evidence, that the Defendant was negligent. The Plaintiff can rest his case on an
unrebutted presumption but not on an inference. The presumption of negligence was
rebutted. The Plaintiff never responded. Neither before nor after the Defendant testified
did the Plaintiff take any steps to suggest or prove that Defendant was negligent. Neither
in closing argument nor in his Trial Memorandum did the Plaintiff argue that Defendant
was negligent. He has never even pleaded negligence. The fact that the Defendant was
not negligent has essentially been conceded.
In McPherson the Plaintiff proved (1) a bailment and that his property was
missing. (2) the Defendant presented some evidence that the property was stolen. He
testified that the property was in his condominium, which had normal locks on the door,
and he remembered locking the doors. (3) The Plaintiff however presented evidence that
the investigating officer found no evidence of forcible entry suggesting the circumstances
were suspicious. The court concluded in that case that Defendant was negligent. Id.
In Staheli, the Utah Supreme Court compared the burden of going forward and the
burden of persuasion in bailment cases to the conditions generally considered necessary
to invoke res ipsa loquitur. There are three conditions in a res ipsa loquitur cases. The
first according to Prosser and quoted in Staheli is "the event must be of a kind which
ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence." Id. at 684. A freezer
going out, and the contents spoiling, is not the type of event that is a result of someone's
negligence. The Defendant should not be held liable for such an event.
The Court did not hold the Defendant bailor liable in Staheli.
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Unlike the cases cited in Plaintiffs Trial Memorandum the Plaintiff in the
immediate case has not attempted to prove or infer the Defendant was negligent—without
which the Plaintiff is not entitled to a judgment.
B.

GRATUITOUS BAILMENT. If a bailment is gratuitous, meaning that the

person holding the property receives no benefit for the service, then the Plaintiff must
prove more than simple negligence. The bailee in a gratuitous bailment is only liable for
gross negligence. McPherson at 305. It is arguable that the defendant in the immediate
case was acting gratuitously. He did not receive any payment for holding the fish and had
to expend his own money to power the freezer.
With no evidence that the Defendant was negligent, there is clearly no evidence
that he acted with gross negligence.
C.

UCC BAILMENT. Under the UCC a warehouseman is only liable if he is

negligent. Because Plaintiff has produced no evidence to suggest Defendant was
negligent—defendant could not be liable here. UCC § 70A-7-204(l) provides that "a
warehouseman is liable for damages for loss of or injury to the goods cause by his failure
to exercise such care in regard to them as a reasonably careful man would exercise under
like circumstances but unless otherwise agreed he is not liable for damages which could
not have been avoided by the exercise of such care.'5
D.

AGISTMENT CONTRACT. The Plaintiff cites to Cornia v. Wilcox, 898

P.2d 1379 (Utah 1995), an agistment contract case. "An agistment contract is a species of
bailment whereby one agrees to keep and care for another's animals." Id. at 1383. The
Plaintiff maintains that "while the contract in the instant case is not an agistment contract,
the policy and rationale behind allocation of risk and loss [in Cornia] is relevant and
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applicable." Memo page 2-3. The policy and rationale in Cornia is that the Defendant
must be proven to be negligent before the Plaintiff can recover. Again, the Defendant
presented unrebutted evidence that he exercised due care in storing Plaintiffs fish.
E.

CONCLUSION FROM BAILMENT CASES. Either this is a bailment

case and the Plaintiff failed to plead and prove thereunder or this is some analogous
theory where the Plaintiff is taking favorable elements from the bailment cases and
overlooking the disagreeable element—negligence. All the evidence presented suggested
that Mr. White exercised due care. There were no questions on direct or cross
examination that even questioned his due care.
4.

CHAPTER 2 OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE DEALING WITH
SALES CONTRACTS IS NOT APPLICABLE IN THE IMMEDIATE CASE.
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT SELLING GOODS TO DEFENDANT AND
DEFENDANT WAS NOT PURCHASING GOODS FROM PLAINTIFF.
The Defendant cites to U.C.A. § 70A-2-5094 which sets forth the "risk of loss"

where the legal theory or cause of action is based on a sales contract. Utah's version of
Chapter 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides that "the risk of loss passes to the
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70A-2-509. Risk of loss in the absence of breach.
(1)
Where the contract requires or authorizes the seller to ship the goods by carrier
(a)
if it does not require him to deliver them at a particular destination, the risk of loss passes
to the buyer when the goods are duly delivered to the carrier even though the shipment is under reservation
(Section 70A-2-505); but
(b)
if it does require him to deliver them at a particular destination and the goods are there
duly tendered while in the possession of the carrier, the risk of loss passes to the buyer when the goods are
there duly so tendered as to enable the buyer to take delivery.
(2)
Where the goods are held by a bailee to be delivered without being moved, the risk of loss passes
to the buyer
(a) on his receipt of a negotiable document of title covering the goods; or
(b) on acknowledgment by the bailee of the buyer's right to possession of the goods; or
(c) after his receipt of a nonnegotiable document of title or other written direction to deliver, as
provided in Subsection (4) (b) of Section 70A-2-503.
(3)
In any case not within Subsection (1) or (2), the risk of loss passes to the buyer on his receipt of
the goods if the seller is a merchant; otherwise the risk passes to the buyer on tender of delivery.
(4)
The provisions of this section are subject to contrary agreement of the parties and to the provisions
of this chapter on sale on approval (Section 70A-2-327) and on effect of breach on risk of loss (Section
70A-2-510).
(Emphsis added.)
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buyer on his receipt of the goods if the seller is a merchant." Section 509(3). In other
words, if Defendant (1) was under contract to purchase fish from the Plaintiff, (2) took
possession of the fish, and (3) the fish spoiled in his possession he would, nevertheless,
be obligated under the original contract to pay for the fish simply because he took the
fish. Under such a contract there is no need to prove anything more than "I delivered the
goods now pay me for them." The risk of loss is imposed upon the possessor.
The Plaintiff argues Section 509 in his memorandum by analogy but
acknowledges his theory is not one determined by UCC Chapter 2. It is undisputed that
this is not a case of a sales contract. 5 UCC Chapter 2 does not apply here directly or by
analogy.
5.

THE DEFENDANT DOES NOT PRESENT A THEORY BASED IN
CONTRACT.
During trial the parties both acknowledged that they were not operating under a

written contract or any type of understanding relative to risk of loss. When Grant White
agreed to hold Silver Creek's fish until he could obtain the supplies to can the same they
did not discuss who would be responsible in the event the fish spoiled. They also agreed
that they had no previous experience or pattern of conduct. Without an agreement there is
no agreement to enforce. Plaintiff does not present any contract theory in his Trial
Memorandum.
The only possible contract is a common law bailment contract discussed above.

5

Plaintiff acknowledges that we are not dealing with a sales contract in his memorandum at page 4, " . . .
The transfer of possession of the Smoked Sturgeon and Smoked Tilapia to Defendant was not a sale
"
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6.

CONCLUSION.
The Plaintiffs case should be dismissed because of a failure to state a cause of

action upon which relief can be granted or for failure to prove the elements of the legal
theories presented in his Trial Memorandum, namely, bailment or sales contract.
DATED this 10th day of August 2004.

DAINES, WYATT & ALLEN, LLP

Scott trWyatt
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SILVER CREEK FARMS,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case Number: 020101751

VS
TROUT OF PARADISE, INC.,
Defendant.

This case was tried before the Court on June 30, 2004. At the close of trial, the Court
made certain findings and directed the parties to brief issues of allocation of the risk of loss
and whether a settlement was effected. Because the Court desired more information
concerning the settlement issue, more leeway was given to the parties in briefing this issue.
Each of the parties subsequently filed memorandum. On September 9, 2004, Defendant filed
supplemental material on the issue of settlement. Plaintiff has not filed anything in response
to Defendant's supplemental material. Having reviewed the additional information provided to
the Court, in conjunction with the testimony, exhibits and argument presented at trial, the
Court now issues this Memorandum Decision.
At trial, the Court found there was an oral contract between Plaintiff and Defendant to
can fish which was to be furnished by Plaintiff to Defendant. Additionally, the Court finds that
there were no specific terms agreed to by the parties concerning the amount of fish to be
canned and when it was to be canned. The Court makes the following other Findings of
Facts:

\dcfffal
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(1) In October, 1998, Rachelle Gibson, an employee of Plaintiff, telephoned White to
see if Defendant could can some fish for them for the Christmas season. White said
that Defendant could can the fish.
(2) On November 5,1999 the following fish was trucked to White;
a. Smoked Trout-1020 pounds
b. Smoked Sturgeon-773 pounds
c. Smoked Tilapia-270 pounds
d. Smoked Salmon-40 pounds
e. Frozen Fish-600 pounds
(3) White did not agree or understand that Silver Creek would be sending these
amounts of fish for him to can. The delivered fish was more than he expected to can.
(4) White informed Silver Creek that he did not have enough cans to complete the
canning.
(5) White canned the smoked trout and salmon which was returned to Silver
Creek.
(6) Silver Creek instructed White to can the sturgeon and tilapia when he was able to
obtain cans.
(7) The Court specifically finds there was no agreement concerning risk of loss for the
destruction of the fish. The Court further finds that there was no prior problems with
fish spoiling between White and Silver Creek, so the Court must look to what each party
should have done.

(8) The Court finds that after December, 1998, there was little if any contact by Silver
Creek to White which shows that Silver Creek was not supervising the canning
correctly. Very easily Silver Creek could have gotten the fish back and had someone
else can the fish.
(9) The Court finds that White should have made sure the freezer was working properly
and while he was serving in the military he should have had someone else caring for
the freezer.
(10) The Courtfindsthat while the complaint of the Plaintiff is not the most artfully
drafted and does not specifically plead negligence, the Plaintiff has referred to
negligence in the memorandum filed after the trial. Pursuant to Rule 15 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure the Court is considering this legal theory according to the proof
presented at trial.
(11) Therefore, the Court finds that both Plaintiff and Defendant should have done more
and didn't which makes each of them negligent and which results in of them breaching
the oral contract. Thus, Plaintiff and Defendant will both be responsible for the risk of
loss and damages. The Court will apportion the risk of loss between the parties. The
Court specifically finds that White felt that he was responsible for some part of the loss
because he testified at trial that he felt part of the loss was his fault.

In order to apportion the loss, the Court must look to the value of the fish. Silver Creek
valued the smoked tilapia at $9.25 per pound and the smoked sturgeon at $12.00 per pound.
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White disputed these values arguing that was the fresh fish or fresh frozen fish price and that
is should be valued at frozen fish price. However, White does not submit any other evidence
to the Court supporting his allegation that it was frozen fish and should be valued at a lower
price. Therefore, the Court finds that the wholesale price for the smoked tilapia is $9.25 per
pound and $12.00 per pound for the smoked sturgeon. Therefore, the total loss to Silver
Creek is $11,773.50.
The Court as stated above has apportioned the loss between Silver Creek and White at
50 percent to each. Therefore, White's portion is $5,886.75. It is undisputed that White paid
$2500.00 to the collection agency on December 8, 2001. After deducting the $2500.00
payment White's remaining portion is $3,386.75. Additionally, the Court finds that statutory
prejudgment interest of 10 percent per annum shall accrue on this principal amount owed by
White to Silver Creek from June, 1999 until date of judgment. The interest shall run from that
date because according to the parties oral contract White was to can the fish at a later date.
The Court also orders that post judgment interest shall be at the statutory rate of 3.28 percent
per annum after this date.
With regards to the issue of whether a settlement was reached between Silver Creek
and Trout of Paradise, Inc. the Court specifically finds that there was testimony at trial that the
$2500.00 check was to be paid within a certain time which is was not. Furthermore, the notes
from the collection agency which is marked as exhibit k indicates that there were telephone
calls between White and the collection agency, but shows that the parties did not reach an
agreement as to the settlement amount. It is White's obligation to prove by a preponderance

of the evidence that a settlement or an accord and satisfaction was reached. He has failed to
do this. This is further supported by the fact the notation line on the check which indicated
payment in full had been whited out by the collection agency. Therefore, the Court does not
consider the $2500.00 payment as payment in full.
Judgment should enter against White as set forth herein. Silver Creek's counsel is
directed to prepare a judgment in accordance with this Memorandum Decision.

Dated this 3 f f

day of

O C^r

. ^GQ *f

Silver Creek vs Trout of Paradise/TLW/adb

t>^^r~

cr

~xr

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 020101751 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Dated t h i s

sa

day of

NAME
STEPHEN B ELGGREN
ATTORNEY PLA
P.O. BOX 900790
SANDY, UT 84090-0790
SCOTT L WYATT
ATTORNEY DEF
108 N MAIN #200
LOGAN UT 84321

, 20 o f .

\QJJ>O

Deputy Court Clerk

Scott LWyatt #5829
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